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William Twiningt
I had with each case carried the analysis of its import to the limits
of my ability. Yet again and again, as our discussions proceeded, he
would challenge or add, defend what he had added, if defending were
needed, with inexhaustible brilliance, until I in awe one day queried,
"Karl, how do you do it?" "Why, Ad," he replied, with more pride in
his profession than in himself, "I am a case-trained lawyer-and what
is more, I am one of the three best in the country!"
E. Adamson Hoebel
In 1928-29, Karl Llewellyn spent a semester at the University of Leipzig
as a visiting professor. This was the first of two academic visits that marked
an important stage in his intellectual development. He had first graduated from
Yale Law School in 19182 and, until 1928, almost all of his teaching, writing
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and professional activities had related to contracts and commercial law, espe-
cially sales. He had long been interested in theoretical issues and he had been
an enthusiastic, though relatively junior, participant in the intellectual ferment
that culminated in the Columbia curriculum discussions of 1926-28. If one
discounts The Bramble Bush? as a contribution to jurisprudence,4 it is striking
that Llewellyn's first two theoretical works of substance were both developed
in Leipzig and written in German. Prdjudizienrecht und Rechtsprechung in
Amerika5 published in 1933, was a slightly revised version of the lectures,
cases, and materials that formed the basis for a course that he gave during his
first visit. Recht, Rechtsleben und Gesellschaft was an expanded version of a
lecture delivered during his second stay in Leipzig in 1931. This was first
published in German in 1977, edited by Manfred Rehbinder.6 There is as yet
no English version. The Case Law System in America (hereinafter Case Law)
is a translation of the text of Prdjudizienrecht, omitting the cases and materials.
As is well known, Llewellyn had been to school in Mecklenburg, had
fought briefly on the German side in 1914 and, according to some, had a better
command of German than English.7 However, his first visit to Leipzig in 1928-
29 provided him with his first sustained exposure to German law and legal
scholarship. He read avidly, conversed indefatigably, and made many contacts
and friendships. Perhaps even more important, as Paul Gewirtz brings out in
his Introduction to Case Law,8 the task of trying to explain American case law
and common law method to a German audience stimulated him to articulate
and develop his own ideas at a more general level than he had done previously.
His German was fluent, his account of the American system was confident, but
in this work his comments on the German legal and juristic scene were striking-
ly tentative and diffident.
Prajudizienrecht contains only a brief discussion of "free law" theory9 and,
in contrast to his later work, there is only one passing reference each to Weber
and Ehrlich. 10 In 1928 Llewellyn was just beginning his immersion in German
3. K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH (1930).
4. See, e.g., the assessment of Bramble Bush offered in W. TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE
REALIST MOVEMENT 140-52 (1973).
5. The title page reads: PRA=UDIZIENRECHT UND RECHTSPRECHUNG IN AMERIKA: EINE SPRUCHAUSWAHL
MIT BESPRECHUNG von K.N. Llewellyn, Professor des Rechts an der Columbia University in New York,
unter Mithilfe bei der Auswahl von William A. Leider, Rechtsanwalt in New York, und bei der Verdeutschung
von Wolfram v. Metzler, Referendar in Berlin. Verlag von Theodor Weicher / Leipzig. 1933 [hereinafter
PRAyJuDZIENcHT].
6. K. LLEWELLYN, REcHT, REcHTSLEBEN UND GESEL.SCHAFT (M. Rehbinder, ed.) (1977) [hereinafter
Rehbinder].
7. For details of Llewellyn's German connections, see W. TWINING, supra note 4, and Rehbinder supra
note 6.
8. Pp. xii-xiii.
9. Pp. 2-4, 76-78.
10. Pp. 82 (Weber), 47 n.2 (Ehrlich). On Weber, see infra note 26.
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legal culture. Sensibly, he did not claim to be doing comparative law." Rather,
he adopted the standpoint of an American legal scholar interpreting one aspect
of his own system for German colleagues.12
Llewellyn's central concern was to describe and interpret the main features
of the case law system as it operates in practice with particular reference to the
tensions between factors which generate judicial discretion and factors which
constrain it-the "leeways" and "the steadying factors." 13 The method adopted
is "show and tell." His German audience was presented with, and expected to
study in detail, translations of judicial opinions (mostly unabridged) in nearly
sixty reported cases, about half of them from New York state courts. These
cases were not merely there as illustrations of general points, but rather "to
show how the doctrine of precedent actually works" 4 through concrete exam-
ples. Llewellyn was careful to emphasize that this was a small and not necessar-
ily representative sample of appellate cases. What he was doing, of course, was
dramatizing the common law method. This was a case-lawyer acting like a
case-lawyer before an audience of civilians. Llewellyn used a similar ap-
proach-and some of the same cases-in The Common Law Tradition15 and
in his materials on "Elements" (which formed the basis of Mentschikoff and
Stotzky's The Theory and Craft of American Law--Elements).16 About two-
thirds of Prdjudizienrecht consists of a quite elementary introduction, a com-
mentary on some of the cases, and a comprehensive, but succinct, statement
of his own interpretation of the case law "system."' 7
11. Llewellyn's Introduction begins: "What is striking and mysterious in comparing two legal systems
is the ways they are similar and the ways they are different," P. 1. However, Llewellyn makes no attempt
at sustained comparison, but merely makes brief and generally cautious references to German sources and
ideas on a number of specific points. See also the remarks at 108-09.
12. Gewirtz states that Case Law "stands between The Bramble Bush (1930) and The Common Law
Tradition (1960). This place 'in between' gives the present book a unique strength: greater complexity and
sophistication than The Bramble Bush and a greater directness and conciseness than The Common Law
Tradition." P. xiii (citations omitted). He attributes these differences to Llewellyn's different conceptions
of his audiences and to the fact that the Leipzig lectures provided him with the opportunity "to undertake
a different kind of scholarship, a 'study of the sociology of case law."' P. xiv. Though Gewirtz is correct
that the difference between audiences is crucial, it is worth stressing that The Bramble Bush and Case Law
are almost contemporaneous. On those works' very different audiences, see pp. xxxiii (first-year law students
and German lawyers) and xxxvi (scholars). The Leipzig course preceded the first "Bramble Bush" lectures
in 1929. Although Prijudizlenrecht was not published until three years after the first tentative printing of
The Bramble Bush, it is reasonable to infer that the final text did not involve substantial changes after 1928-
29. If this is correct, Case Law represents a more considered and scholarly statement of Llewellyn's views
in 1928-30 than The Bramble Bush. This supports the thesis that The Common Law Tradition does not mark
a significant retreat from his earlier views.
13. The term "steadying factors" comes later (notably in K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADI-
TION (1960)), but the idea is implicit in Case Law.
14. P. xxxiii. (emphasis in original).
15. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 13.
16. S. MENTSCHIKOFF & L STOTZKY, THETHEORY AND CRAFr OF AMERICAN LAW-ELEMENTS (1981).
17. One of the central themes of Case Law relates to whether American treatment of case law is
"systematic." See index, p. 125, for numerous citations to "system in case law". Llewellyn was not quite
as skeptical as Charles Sampford or Brian Simpson. See C. SAMPFORD, THE DISORDER OF LAW (1989);
Simpson, The Common Law and Legal Theory, in LEGAL THEORY AND THE COMMON LAW 24 (W. Twining,
ed.) (1986) ("more like a muddle than a system").
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Despite the brevity of Llewellyn's own text, Prdjudizienrecht was immedi-
ately recognized in both Germany and the United States as an original, pro-
found and balanced contribution to legal theory. 8 But for political events in
Germany,19 the book might have become better known and Llewellyn might
never have acquired his misleading reputation as a radical iconoclast. For this
was a balanced, perceptive, and remarkably mature evocation of an essentially
romantic vision of the common law tradition.
The publication of an English version of Llewellyn's text is both welcome
and timely. The translation is elegant and exact, the editing is judicious, and
Professor Gewirtz's Introduction is helpful. Clearly it would not have made
sense in publishing terms to reprint the original cases and materials. Their
omission from Case Law deprives it of the self-conscious particularity of
Prdjudizienrecht and explains the seemingly bland generality of parts of the
English version, some of which cannot be readily understood without reference
to the original cases. Nevertheless, the enterprise is worthwhile. Interpretation
has become one of the central concerns of contemporary jurisprudence. Case
Law offers a compact and illuminating introduction to Llewellyn's main ideas
on one aspect of these concerns: the interpretation of appellate cases. It also
illustrates the close connection between Llewellyn's general sociology of law
and his more particular jurisprudential writings.
This judgment requires justification. Skeptics might well ask: First, what
does this translation add to our knowledge of Llewellyn? Second, what is new
or distinctive about it that makes it topical today?
The first question can be answered quite briefly. To begin with, there is
very little in the work that cannot be found elsewhere in Llewellyn's extensive
writings on the same subject in English.2' There are, however, some fresh
apergus and some subtle formulations." Its main appeal is that it contains his
most concise and readable statement of his general ideas on case law.'
Llewellyn was on his best behavior. Friends ironed out some of the idiosyncra-
cies of his German, the translator has done some further smoothing, and Karl
is presented having been "washed, trimmed, shaved and forced into clean
18. The main reviews are cited by Gewirtz at x, n.3.
19. I have been told that the publisher's stock of Prdjudizienrecht was destroyed after the Nazis came
to power, but I have no direct evidence to support this. It is a rare book.
20. Apart from The Bramble Bush and The Common Law Tradition, there are numerous articles and
manuscripts dealing with topics discussed in The Case Law Tradition in America. See the bibliographies
in W. TWINING, TIE KARL LLEWELLYN PAPERS 47-78 (1968). Perhaps the single most important general
discussion is Llewellyn's article Case Law, in 3 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 249-51 (1930);
see also Llewellyn, Case Method, in id. at 251.
21. For example, on dissents, see pp. 50-51 (section 41) and on separate opinions, see pp. 52-56
(section 42), and on differing conceptions of legal scholarship passim; on "system" see supra note 17.
22. But see Llewellyn, Case Law (article), supra note 20.
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linen."' Moreover, Prajudizienrecht has been out of print for many years and
generally inaccessible, even to those who can read German.'
Second, Case Law provides strong evidence of the continuity of Llewellyn's
thought.' Here, as in his later writings, he carefully charts a middle course
between the extremes of formalism and radical indeterminacy. Leeways for
decision are inevitable, but judicial discretion is significantly constrained by
a number of factors, the most important of which is the particular craft-tradition
of American common law adjudication and justification. Despite the leeways,
American appellate judging exhibits a greater degree of regularity and predict-
ability than one might reasonably expect, but this is largely in spite of, rather
than because of, the doctrine of precedent or formalized rules of substantive
law. The common law tradition at its best accommodates both the need for
certainty and the need for change. This rendering might serve as a summary
of the main thesis of The Common Law Tradition. In the later work some of
the central ideas are restated and developed in much greater detail, sometimes
using different terms, such as the following: steadying factors, styles of judging,
situation sense, precedent techniques, the thrust and parry of canons of statutory
interpretation, the ABC's of appellate advocacy. But the two works are very
close in spirit and substance. In 1930 as much as in 1960, Karl Llewellyn was
an optimistic interpreter, from within, of the common law tradition.
Third, Case Law provides some evidence in support of the thesis that
Llewellyn's general approach and most of his central ideas had been formed
before he became intimately acquainted with German legal thought and cul-
ture.26 His visits to Leipzig stimulated him to articulate and develop his gener-
al ideas about adjudication and the sociology of law. He had considerable
affinity with several German thinkers and over time he undoubtedly learned
much from Max Weber and others. 7 There is little evidence of direct German
influence on the general direction of his thought before 1929, however. By then
his main interests and his most important ideas had been formed, at least in
embryo. A more plausible view is that, insofar as it is meaningful to talk of
German "influence," it is more discernible in the assimilation of the work of
nineteenth-century German jurists by Llewellyn's American forerunners, such
as Carter, Gray, Holmes, Hohfeld and Pound3
23. Said by Sydney Smith of Jeremy Bentham in a review of The Book of Fallacies;from Unfinished
Papers ofJeremy Bentham, 42 EDINBURGH REV. 367, 367-68 (1825).
24. See supra note 19.
25. See supra note 12.
26. P. xii; W. TWINING, supra note 4, at 104-09.
27. Llewellyn had some familiarity with the ideas of Weber and Ehrlich by 1928-29, but it seems likely
that his more intensive reading of Weber came later. Llewellyn's papers contain extensive drafts of a
projected translation of Weber's Sociology of Law dating from about 1935. See also Rehbinder, supra note
6, passim.
28. W. TWINING, supra note 4, at 108. Earlier John Austin had been a major conduit of German juristic
ideas into Anglo-American jurisprudence. See W.L. MORISON, JOHN AUSTIN 60-63 (1982).
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Why should anyone other than afficionados wish to read this book in 1991?
Paul Gewirtz stresses its topicality.29 The book presents a moderate alternative
to arguments about radical indeterminacy associated with the critical legal
studies movement. Llewellyn, Gewirtz suggests, helped to create an "enduring
crisis" by demonstrating the indeterminacy of legal rules, but he also showed
a way out of the crisis by finding other props of "legal certainty" in the operat-
ing techniques of lawyers and judges, the facts of particular cases, and "real-life
norms."3 Gewirtz compares Llewellyn to Stanley Fish, suggesting that both
find the main constraint on free interpretation of texts in the know-how of an
interpretive community rather than in formal rules. However, Gewirtz finds
Llewellyn more balanced and subtle than Fish, in that Fish emphasizes practice
to the exclusion of rules, whereas Llewellyn saw doctrine and the judge's sense
of duty as guiding and giving direction to the exercise of judicial technique in
arriving at justifications for their decisions.31
This interesting argument contains an element of truth, but it involves a
somewhat anachronistic interpretation of Case Law. 32 In 1929 Llewellyn saw
himself as steering a middle course between two extremes: "the deductive
model" of legal formalism and the "free law movement," the latter of which
he saw as being directed against literal interpretation rather than in favor of
radical indeterminacy.33 Today the simplicities of the deductive model have
been superceded by the much more sophisticated theories of Herbert Wechsler,
Ronald Dworkin and others.3 Llewellyn, not always convincingly, used analo-
gies from art, architecture and general aesthetics.35 He might well have been
intrigued by some recent invocations of analogies from literature and literary
theory, but one can only speculate about his likely reactions to the uses to
which they have been put by Dworkin, Fish, and James Boyd White, by
deconstructionists, and by others. It might have depended in part on timing and




32. On anachronistic "conversational readings" of juristic texts, see Twining, "Reading Bentham,"
Maccabean Lecture on Jurisprudence, Lecture Delivered to the British Academy (October 24, 1989); lxxv
PROCEEDINGS OF THE BRITISH ACADEMY 97-141 (1989). I am rather more sympathetic to Fish than either
Gewirtz or Dennis Patterson, who dismisses the comparison between Fish and Llewellyn. Patterson, Law's
Practice, 90 COLuM. L. REV. 575, 589 n.55 (1990). To my mind they are both subtle, but rather different,
thinkers.
33. As Llewellyn wrote in Case Law:
Nonetheless, it has long since become clear that the exertions of the "free law" proponents even
in the heat of battle were directed not against a true legal certainty or against the continuity of
decision making, but rather against a "literalness" of interpretation that corresponded neither to
the nature of language nor to that of the best legal tradition.
P. 78 n.3.
34. The "neutral principles" debate began shortly before Llewellyn's death. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note
13, at 384-93. Unfortunately, Ronald Dworkin does not deign to take Llewellyn seriously. On a charitable
reading of each there may be more affinities than meet the eye.
35. See W. TWINING, supra note 4, at 568 ("legal aesthetics" index entry).
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road position. He would almost certainly have been skeptical of some of the
more abstract arguments. For in both Case Law and The Common Law Tradi-
tion, Llewellyn, the case-trained lawyer, was still trying to describe, evoke, and
interpret common law method in concrete terms from within, rather than to
apply to legal phenomena abstract ideas, conceived in other contexts, at rela-
tively high levels of generality.
There is another aspect of Case Law that distinguishes it from Llewellyn's
other writings on the subject, especially The Common Law Tradition, and that
can be claimed as a distinctive contribution to the subject. Among the many
criticisms that have been levelled at the The Common Law Tradition, two
related points stand out. First, by failing to place his study of state appellate
courts clearly in the context of the total picture of all courts, of all litigation,
and even of all dispute settlement in American society, Llewellyn adopted an
unduly narrow perspective and glossed over a number of important issues. 3
This is surprising because his own "law jobs" theory was, and remains, the best
vehicle for performing this function. Sadly, the contextualist failed to place his
most substantial particular study in context. Second, Llewellyn adopted a
peculiar methodology for a purportedly realistic empirical study of particular
legal institutions in action. He thus missed an opportunity to link his sociology
of law to his more specialized work and laid himself open to charges of
"barefoot empiricism."
37
Case Law is particularly interesting in light of this missed opportunity. A
constant theme of the book is that the case law system in .action should be
viewed from an anthropological (sometimes sociological) perspective.3 De-
spite the relative informality of the presentation, Llewellyn was also clearly
concerned about some of the methodological problems of the enterprise. And
throughout, he makes it clear that he is acutely aware that the study of appellate
judicial practice with respect to precedent is a narrow topic that needs to be
set in a broader context. The last paragraph of the Conclusion is worth quoting
in full:
36. See id. at 248-57, 268-69.
37. See id. at 268. On "barefoot empiricism" see Schubert, The Future of Public Law, 34 GEo. WASH.
L. REV. 593, 601 (1966), discussed in W. RUMBLE, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM 170-75 (1968).
38. See P. 126 ("Sociology of Law" index entry). Llewellyn seems to use "anthropology" and
"sociology" almost interchangeably and rather loosely in Case Law. But see p. 47 n.2.
Interestingly, Llewellyn's combination of broad historical and geographical perspectives with his kind
of "sociology" anticipated a recent trend in legal anthropology. For example, at a conference held at Bellagio
in 1985, a number of distinguished legal anthropologists admitted to having neglected the broader historical
and geographical contexts in their earlier localized studies of groups or "tribes." They also acknowledged
the importance of studying "discourse." See generally HISTORY AND POWER IN THE STUDY OF LAW: NEW
DIRECTIONS IN LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY (J. Starr & J. Collier eds. 1989). Furthermore, on an earlier occasion
I heard Hoebel publicly acknowledge that The Cheyenne Way neglected Cheyenne concepts and ways of
thought. See K. LLEWELLYN & E.A. HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY (1941).
Llewellyn, on the other hand, shows in Case Law that he was acutely sensitive to history, discourse,
and geographical context. In this respect at least, he would have found himself very much in tune with these
"new directions."
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I regret that the area studied here is such a narrow one. Only upper
court cases are treated; and then, only the relation between decision
making and legal rules. Thus, it deals only with the appellate level; with
legal doctrine and the case law system at this appellate level; with the
creation, development, handling, and effects of legal rules at this level.
There is nothing about the extremely important trial court level, about
how procedure affects the workings of legal rules; virtually nothing
about the influence of legal rules on the practice of law, particularly the
practice of those lawyers who are primarily client counselors. There is
truly nothing about the influence of legal rules on the lives of people
whose interests the law affects. While such a narrow field of study may
seem rather paltry, I nonetheless would wish to say: It only looks that
way. For a science is made up of only modest, small-scale works. In
the area worked on here, at least, we are able to have known facts
before our eyes-which, in legal study, has not been all that common.
Admittedly, the exclusive focus on appellate court decisions and legal
rules plays into the lawyer's peculiar prejudice that these decisions are
precisely what matters, in and of themselves, regardless of the effects
they may have on the society from which they spring. But perhaps it
is precisely here that hope lies. Once we get to thinking about what
these legal rules really are, what their meaning really is, what the nature
even of supreme court decision making is, then we must already be
drawing closer to Life and finding in ourselves the urge to obtain more
firsthand knowledge about the whole purpose of law, its utility to
society in general. But once our legal fraternity feels this urge within
it, the smaller problems-like questions about the nature and growth of
precedent-will be solved through a new wealth of illuminating facts.39
It would not be difficult to criticize Llewellyn's rather loose use of "sociol-
ogy" and "anthropology" in this context or his somewhat anecdotal approach
to "sampling" cases. However, my concern here is to construct a more charita-
ble interpretation by trying to clarify the connection between Llewellyn's
general sociology of law and his particularistic writings about case law and
common law methods.
The passage quoted above shows that Llewellyn was already sensitive to
the broader context of this particular study. Although Case Law precedes his
intensive reading of Max Weber,4 his collaboration with Hoebel, and the
development of the "law jobs theory," he was already well-read in anthropology
and had begun to work on a project on "Mechanisms of Group Control," some
fragments of which survive in his Papers.4 ' As Recht, Rechtsleben und
Gesellschaft shows, the period 1927-33 marks a crucial phase in the develop-
ment of his general sociological ideas. Case Law clearly illustrates how closely
his sociological and legal concerns were intertwined. More attention has been
39. P. 114 (emphasis in original).
40. See supra note 27.
41. K. Llewellyn, Mechanisms of Group Control, (1927) (available in Karl Llewellyn Papers, University
of Chicago Law School (1927-33)); see also W. TWINIG, supra note 4, at 170, 434 n.3.
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paid to Llewellyn the "rule skeptic" and interpreter of realism than to his
sociology of law, and these have often been perceived as two largely separate
phases of his work. In Case Law, far from being an intellectual schizophrenic,
the anthropologist and lawyer speak with a single voice. The work attempts to
present an anthropological perspective on a particular legal phenomenon. At
a time when the sociology of law is thought to be in crisis and is marginalized
within legal scholarship, this integration is suggestive, even if the underlying
conception of sociology seems a little dated.42
The phenomenon under consideration is a particular kind of practice, viz.,
"the operating technique"4 3 of judges in dealing with prior precedents. The
data are derived almost entirely from judicial opinions, which Llewellyn
explicitly acknowledges are reasoned justifications for decisions 4 This under-
mines any sharp distinction between "what judges say" and "what judges do,"
for a description of what judges do is being derived from what they say in their
opinions. Rather, the key distinction is between the doctrine of precedent and
precedent techniques. The doctrine of precedent consists of formal rules that
prescribe what a judge must (not), may (not), can (not) do with prior cases.45
Precedent techniques, on the other hand, are the actual kinds of moves judges
in fact make (e.g. distinguishing, overruling, discrediting) in interpreting and
arguing about prior cases within or in spite of the doctrine.46 Both the doctrine
and the techniques are part of judicial reasoning. Because the doctrine of
precedent is both vague and permissive, even in jurisdictions where it is
allegedly "strict" (as in England), it is relatively easily formulated in quite
simple terms.47 On the other hand, the techniques available to judges are much
more varied and more complex, requiring a richer and more subtle vocabulary
to describe them. Llewellyn's unique contribution to the study of precedent
was to give an account of both doctrine and techniques, and no one has ever
succeeded in giving a better account. The objection to nearly all traditional
discussions of precedent is that they either concentrate exclusively on doctrine
or give very thin accounts of the operative techniques. 9 Llewellyn's insight
42. It is beyond the scope of this review to explore in detail Llewellyn's conception of sociology and,
in particular, whether he can be rescued from charges of"extreme functionalism." A. HUNT, THE SOCIOLOG-
ICAL MOVEMENT IN LAW 58 (1978); see also id. at 48-53.
43. P. 48 (emphasis omitted).
44. P. xxxiv.
45. This passage is a restatement of Llewellyn's views in my own words, based on several of his
writings in addition to Case Law.
46. For example: "I need not follow this case because .... (distinguishing); "I am bound to follow
this case because .... (invoking the doctrine of precedent); "This case is wrongly decided, because...."
(overruling).
47. W. TwNNG & D. MIERs, How To Do THINGS WITH RULES 269-71 (2d ed. 1982).
48. See the admittedly crude list of sixty-four "Available Impeccable Precedent Techniques" in THE
COMION LAW TRADrION, supra note 12, at 77-91; see also W. TWINING & D. MIERS, supra note 47, at
276-86.
49. See, e.g., R. CROSS, PRECEDENT IN ENGLISH LAW (3d ed. 1977); PRECEDENT IN LAW (L. Goldstein
ed. 1987). A significant exception, much admired by Llewellyn, was E. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL
REASONING (1949), but this work did not purport to give a comprehensive account of the range of precedent
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was to make the examination of doctrine and techniques part of the sociology
of law.
One of the most interesting passages in Case Law is headed "Black-letter
Law versus My Approach: Toward a Sociology of Doctrine."50 Much later,
in the unpublished materials on Law in Our Society, the idea of a "sociology
of dogmatics" was carried a little further, as part of a general theory of the
crafts of law. Llewellyn was planning to develop this idea as part of a projected
series on law in society in connection with a proposed third academic visit to
Germany. Unfortunately, he died before the project was completed.
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of Case Law is that it represents an
early attempt to integrate the sociology of law with a very detailed technical
study of material that is at the core of more traditional legal scholarship in both
common law and civil law systems. Llewellyn's contemporaries (and most later
writers) saw little or no connection between analysis of doctrine (and "law talk"
generally) and the sociology of law. Llewellyn was, therefore, unusual in
developing the idea of a sociology of dogmatics. In this way, he focused on
what today would be called "discourse." This is one potentially fertile field for
the kind of rapprochement between technical, legal, and sociological perspec-
tives that Llewellyn was concerned to promote. This, even more than his
insights on the leeways and constraints of judicial interpretation, justifies the
claim that Case Law deserves attention today. It is to be hoped that before long
it will be joined by an English translation of Recht, Rechtsleben, und
Gesellschaft and an equally well-edited version of Law in Our Society5
techniques in regular use.
50. P. 89-95. The original German reads: "Die hier vertretne Ansicht und die Dogmatik: Zur Soziologie
der Dogmatik." PRA mIZIENRECHT, supra note 5, at 89. This is one point at which we might question the
translation. Llewellyn in his late writings used the term 'dogmatics,' in the German sense, to refer to the
systematic study of doctrine. See, e.g., K. Llewellyn, Law in Our Society (unpublished manuscript), Lecture
XIV. Theory of Dogmatics (1952).
51. K. Llewelllyn, supra note 50.
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Administrative Law: Rethinking Judicial Control of Bureaucracy. By
Christopher F. Edley, Jr.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990. Pp. xiii,
270. $30.00.
Stephen F. Williamst
Acts have unintended consequences; a book may undermine its thesis. For
this reader, at least, Christopher Edley's Administrative Law: Rethinking
Judicial Control of Bureaucracy1 does just that.
Edley's central argument is that judicial review is distorted by an arbitrary
division of decisionmaking into three separate modes-a "trichotomy" of
science, politics, and adjudicatory fairness. He views the three as loosely
corresponding to the division of issues into fact, policy, and law, and in turn
relating to the classical operations of the executive, legislative, and judicial
branches.2 Edley acknowledges that the three modes of thinking are in a sense
different, forming a "trio" that he views as quite legitimate. He reserves the
pejorative metaphor "trichotomy" for the judicial tendency to use the three as
pigeonholes and to break down the gestalt of an agency's decision, and he
traces that tendency to reliance on formalistic notions of separation of powers.
In Edley's view the trichotomy not only has dubious ancestry but generates
practical mischief. His main concerns, apart from difficulty of application, are
that the trichotomy leads courts to extend undue deference to administrative
agencies and enables them to shift issues among the law-fact-policy categories
by sleight of hand, thereby justifying outcomes arrived at on other grounds. He
would sweep aside the entire structure and replace it with "sound governance"
review, which would proceed untrammelled by ideas of special institutional
roles.
3
But Edley, to his great credit, includes in the book a highly instructive
discussion of the Conseil d'Etat, France's ultimate court of administrative
review, that seems to suggest a quite different view: namely, that even where
* Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
t Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
1. C. EDLY, JR., AD.M NISTRATIvE LAW: RETHINKING JUDICIAL CONTROL OF BUREAUCRACY (1990)
[hereinafter cited by page number only].
2. Pp. 15, 21.
3. P. 235.
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formal separation of powers claims are weak or nonexistent, the differences
between a specialized agency on the one hand, and any generalist,
multimembered, complaint-activated reviewing body on the other, will produce
not only deference but degrees of deference that vary, as here, with the charac-
ter of the challenged component of the agency decision.
The Conseil d'ttat lacks several of the attributes that make federal courts
special. Neither constitution nor statute guarantees the members' tenure, though
tradition, Edley reports, does so.4 Though many will have studied law, often
as undergraduates, it does not appear that they will have practiced it;5 even for
the adjudicatory section, not all will even have studied law.' Besides adjudicat-
ing, the Conseil provides advisory and administrative functions, most important-
ly, advising on draft legislation and regulations. It is a civil service organiza-
tion, its members sometimes serve tours of duty in executive agencies, and it
has, Edley says, a "close relation to the executive."
7
As the formal indicia of separation of powers are missing, Edley candidly
notes his expectation of a "strikingly different jurisprudence," S but reports that
in fact he discovered "many of the themes of deference to expertise,
fact-law-policy distinctions, and so forth that are so prominent in United States
law."9 Though sensibly noting that any comparison is difficult-is the standard
of comparison to be "the D.C. Circuit, circa 1975 "10 or something less imper-
ial?-Edley believes that Conseil decisions are no more interventionist than
such American ones as NLRB v. Hearst Publications," Benzene,12 and State
Farm.3 He attributes this similarity of results to the fact that French adminis-
trative law has the same "project" as our own, "control of illegal and abusive
discretion." 4
4. P. 241; see also L. BROWN & J. GARNER, FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 54 (3d ed. 1983)
("unthinkable" to dismiss member of Conseil for political considerations).
5. Most of its members come from the Ecole Nationale d'Administration, which draws its students by
two sets of examinations, one for university graduates (most of whom will have studied law as undergrad-






11. 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
12. Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
13. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
14. P. 245. The Conseil appears at least nominally more ready than our courts to set aside an adminis-
trative act on the basis of an unspoken but quite apparent improper motive. See, e.g., A. VON MEHREN &
J. GORDLEY, THE CIVIL LAW SYSTEM 486-87 (2d ed. 1977) (excerpting decision setting aside restriction
of specific dance hall's hours where order stated plausible grounds but deciding officer was sole competitor
of restricted dance hall). In France such interventions are viewed as corrections of detournement de pouvoir
("abuse of power"). See id. at 474; L. BROWN & L GARNER, supra note 4, at 147-51. One suspects that
many such cases would here be addressed as possible violations of constitutional or statutory restrictions
on conflicts of interest. See, e.g., Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973) (state board composed solely
of optometrists barred by due process from adjudicating its own charges of "unprofessional" conduct against
fellow optometrists whose business board members would inherit); Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409
U.S. 57 (1972) (trial for traffic offenses before mayor, who was responsible for village finances and whose
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That, of course, relocates the question. Why should its "project" be the
same? At least one possibility is that institutional features-even ones not
conventionally seen as bespeaking separation of powers-destine the projects
to be similar. Structure defines purpose, perhaps. Three features catch the eye
immediately: like our federal courts, the Conseil is generalist, multimembered,
and reactive, reviewing only at the instance of complaining parties.15 For the
federal courts, of course, the last feature flows from the case or controversy
requirement and thus in part from separation of powers.
The generalist is obviously at a disadvantage against a specialist on the
latter's turf. The assumption of agency "expertise" may be a source of innocent
merriment in academic analysis of agency-court relations, but agency staffs
typically are expert even where agency heads are not. Particularly in scientific
matters, a panel of generalists must at a minimum invest a great deal of time
to reach a confident conclusion that the specialists erred. Thus, scarcity of
resources in the reviewing body, particularly time, compels a degree of defer-
ence. It inclines the reviewers to concentrate on the issues that keep coming
back to them, such as procedural requirements and broad aspects of substantive
law, but not the more interstitial ones often characterized as application of law
to fact.16 On the recurrent issues, the return on investment of effort will be
greatest.
Working in panels17 also militates for deference-it blurs edges and dis-
courages the taking of any strong line. This is just the flip side of the framers'
provision for a unitary executive. As the concentration of responsibility in a
single person permits "energy" in the executive," its diffusion in a panel saps
energy. Even when administrative authority is vested in a multimembered
agency, at least the possibility of presidential influence (as through appoint-
ments, removal,19 designation of chair, OMB review, etc.) may save the poten-
tial for vigor.
The many-headed character of a review panel is most obviously disabling
when an issue involves allocation of agency resources, as do attacks on agency
court through fines provided substantial portion of village funds, violated due process guarantee of
disinterested and impartial judge).
15. The reactive character of a body may not seem purely structural; perhaps it is midway between
structure and purpose.
16. BreyerJudicial Review f Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363,370 (1986); Note,
Coring the Seedless Grape: A Reinterpretation of Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 986,
990 & n.35 (1987).
17. See L. BRoWN & J. GARNER, supra note 4, at49 (describing composition of Conseil's panels, often
adding up to nine members).
18. THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 (A. Hamilton); J. RABKIN, JUDICIAL COMPULSIONS 66-67 (1989); Strauss,
The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV.
573, 599-602 (1984); see also A. VON MEHREN & J. GORDLEY, supra note 14, at 480-81 (excerpts from
Conseil decision declining to interfere with executive discretion over passport issuance and geographic
restriction, noting inability of courts to act with "the energy and the rapidity essential to the effective
functioning of public service").
19. To the extent the president retains that power. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 690-93 (1988).
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delay or nonenforcement decisions. The compromises, blurring, and averaging
that are common to multiple decisionmakers-not to mention the inconsisten-
cies that flow from accidents of group decisionmaking, such as the sequence
in which issues are addressed2--are at least at cross purposes with the prereq-
uisite of resource allocation: a willingness to "zero out" some worthy projects.
Drastic action is uncollegial. Not surprisingly, we find great deference to
agencies on matters of timing and a presumption of nonreviewability for
nonenforcement.
21
Finally, having ajurisdiction limited to resolving the complaints of affected
parties induces deference in the reviewers. Again the issues of agency resource
allocation, which lie at the root of most disputes over agency delay or nonen-
forcement, illustrate the point most powerfully. A president (with the help of
a brainy aide) can get an overview of a department's total operations and decide
that one set of programs is weak or even counterproductive, while others have
unrealized promise. He may err, and the department may well resist his orders,
but few will argue that the president has stepped out of his role. Not so for a
review panel activated only by the complaints of burdened parties.'
Of course, the formally distinct features of the federal courts-constitutional
life tenure, the case-or-controversy requirement, and the insulation from other
branches and from informal influences-reinforce the predispositions that flow
from the attributes fully shared with the Conseil d'tat. Why should a body so
constituted interfere with an executive agency's policy judgment, except to
bring it into conformity with law?'a But Edley's discussion of the Conseil
suggests that even in the absence of these formal characteristics, reviewing
courts would show great deference, sharply differentiated by type of issue.
Curiously, Edley has relatively little to say about one leading modem case
that suggests that courts have not been as bamboozled or hamstrung by the
"trichotomy" as he supposes: Chevron U.SA. Inc. v. NRDC. 4 Its now famous
supposition that Congress delegated to agencies those interpretive issues that
it did not resolve with reasonable clarity seems to rest on a notion that even
20. See generally Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 802 (1982).
21. Cf. L. BROWN & J. GARNER, supra note 4, at 84 (no complaint possible for failure to initiate
prosecution). Brief research has not revealed whether the Conseil d'ttat extends this deference to nonen-
forcement decisions generally, as per Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985). Cf. L. HURWrrz, THE STATE
AS DEFENDANT: GOVERNMETAL AccOuNTABItmrY AND THE REDRESS OF INDIVMDUAL GRIEVANCES 74
(1981) (arguing that Conseil's role as avenue of redress for individual complaints limits its ability to
"encourage or spur good future behavior," in contrast to that of an ombudsman).
22. Of course, this is reinforced by the nature of judicial factfinding, which is singularly inapt for
assessing program priorities.
23. The Conseil d'ltat claims in quite strong terms not to substitute its view of sound policy for that
of administrators, but it does enforce "general principles of law," derived neither from statute nor constitu-
tion and apparently of subconstitutional character. See A. VON MEHREN & L GORDLEY, supra note 14, at
429-31, 458-60, 472-73, 480-84. The effect may be rather similar to our due process jurisprudence, but
subject to statutory amendment. See id. at 472-73.
24. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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though such issues are, in a sense, ones of "law," they are also issues of
policy.15 Placing their resolution in the politically responsible executive branch
limits the courts to enforcing what Congress has said (either explicitly or by
implication from its explicit language). This matching of task to institution
hardly seems the work of a body caught up in nonfunctional categories or
abstractions. Yet Edley seems to sweep it aside, largely on the ground that
under Chevron a reviewing court may emphasize either the "law-ness" or the
"policy-ness" of an issue.26 But the fact that it is difficult to decide whether
Congress has really resolved an issue hardly undercuts the functionalism or
realism of the Court's ruling.
More generally, Edley's thesis suffers from one key misconception and from
a failure to pose a fundamental question about the nature of the reviewing
enterprise. The misconception lies in his image of the dynamics of judicial
review. He seems to assume that a court fits the decision as a whole into one
of his three "paradigms," and then assesses it in light of the appropriate level
of deference. In its more cynical form, the assumption is that a court decides
on the outcome and then picks a paradigm with a deference level that will make
its justification easy.27 Thus he says of the majority opinion in State Farm:
"The misidentification of the paradigm as science rather than politics gives the
Court's decision an odd quality.'' 2"
But agency decisions typically must rest an outcome on all three of Edley's
paradigms, in varying mixes. In State Farm, for example, the agency had at
the outset of the rulemaking process revealed a political judgment in the least
appetizing form imaginable. Far from stressing the financial burden that passive
restraints would impose on auto buyers, it explained that it was reopening the
issue because of "the difficulties of the automobile industry." 29 This gaffe
might well have undercut any effort to find in the statute a power to reject a
safety device on the grounds of standard cost-benefit analysis, and, for whatever
reason, the agency never made such an effort (at least so far as the public
record shows). Rather, it appeared to adopt a substantive standard tilting
strongly toward regulation, under which it would require a proposed safety
device if it offered any significant benefits (at least if they were not over-
whelmed by costs).,0 It then found that passive restraints did not measure up
even to this criterion. Given those agency choices, the vulnerable point of the
25. Id. at 864-66.
26. P. 147.
27. As Edley joins Judge Friendly and the D.C. Circuit in recognizing that the "substantial evidence"
test for fact findings and the "arbitrary and capricious" test for policy judgments connote in effect the same
degree of deference, he implicitly acknowledges that the fact-policy (or science-politics) distinction is of
little effect. See p. 112; Industrial Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467,473 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Associated
Indus. v. Department of Labor, 487 F.2d 342, 350 (2d Cir. 1973).
28. P. 65.
29. 463 U.S. 29, 38 (1983).
30. 46 Fed. Reg. 53,419, 53,423 (1981) (finding "possibly minimal safety benefits" but "substantial
costs").
1991] 1107
The Yale Law Journal
decision was its science, and there the challengers attacked. Thus, the Court
did not "identify" a paradigm; the agency and litigants did. Had the agency
invoked an authority to rely on standard cost-benefit analysis, presumably the
Court would have asked whether the statute permitted such a view and (if so)
whether the agency had arrived at it without being arbitrary or capricious.
Similarly, Edley seems to view the Court's approach in the Benzene case
as another arbitrary choice of paradigm, but the opposite one. He observes:
"Rather than directly challenging and overruling the 'expert' judgment of the
agency on the merits of its estimate of the health threat, the Court was persuad-
ed by the complaining industry to view the question as one of statutory inter-
pretation."31 But again the agency's approach determined the controlling para-
digm-or, to put it more simply, the battleground for judicial review. The
agency had taken the view that if a chemical in the workplace posed any risk,
the statute authorized it to set an exposure limit at the lowest feasible level.
And it viewed all carcinogens as posing some risk.32 Thus, on its view of the
law, the "science paradigm" was wholly irrelevant,33 at least if industry could
not claim zero risk. Naturally the industry attacked the agency's legal analysis.
And once it persuaded the Court to find a "significant risk" threshold in the
statute, there was no occasion for the Court to address the scientific issues, as
the agency fact-finding did not even purport to satisfy this standard.
Because an agency's order must have adequate underpinnings in fact, law,
and policy, Edley's concern that courts will misidentify or manipulate para-
digms is misplaced. The three "modes" of thinking interact. An agency's
caution in one domain may require it to extend itself in another, just as a
stretch-going to the edge-in one may enable it to occupy safe territory in
another. A broad law-policy judgment by the agency in State Farm might have
sustained its rejection of passive restraints despite the frailties of its science,
but it chose a narrower view of its mandate and thus needed "stronger" science.
In Benzene the agency tried to rely on a broad legal judgment (which if suc-
cessful would have absolved its science of any flaw) but came a cropper. Every
agency order hangs on a kind of chain, and the challengers naturally go for
what they perceive as the weakest link; the court must decide if it is strong
enough. Edley, though emphatic (and correct) that agency decisions draw on
all three of his modes of reasoning, disregards the agency and party choices
that typically make one mode pivotal in court. The effect is to impute to courts
rather fanciful opportunities to choose among modes and thus degrees of
deference.
The question that Edley declines to ask is how to set the goals for judicial
review. Opposed as he is to separation of powers, he frames as a better "pro-
31. P. 76-77.
32. 448 U.S. 607, 624 (1980).
33. See id. at 625.
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ject" for administrative law the advancement of "sound governance."' (Is this
a derivative of Dworkin's task for the Herculean judge, making law "the best
it can be"?) 35 Of course sound governance is as hard to oppose as God and
motherhood used to be. But setting it as the goal for judicial review seems to
suppose no institutional differentiation. Yet if we either removed or disregarded
the institutional differences, a harder question would arise: why have judicial
review at all? If there are no differences at all, there would appear to be no
greater likelihood of getting "better" results, and dispensing with review would
save a great deal of time and expense. Two filters may screen out more bad
judgments than one, but having two identical filters seems hard to justify.
If there are differences between agency and court, but only noninstitutional
ones, the answer is similar. Suppose it were shown that judges are smarter than
agency heads, or have more time on their hands, or have cleverer clerks than
agencies' staff. Even if all this were true, the simple solution would be to
replace the agencies' current personnel with those who now serve as judges and
clerks, and drop judicial "review." Why not get things right the first time? (This
approach is hard to realize in the light of judicial tenure, but for the moment
we disregard institutional peculiarities.) That seems to drive us to institutional
distinctions as the only justification for having two separate decisionmaking
phases. Finding the courts' role must start with asking about their peculiar
institutional traits.
Edley supplies some hints as to how far he would go in breaking the bonds
derived from the institutional differences. Out goes the old rule of Morgan v.
United States,36 which limits the challenger's probing of agency thought
processes to what is formally recorded.37 Courts would be far more accommo-
dating to "plaintiffs' efforts to use discovery and evidentiary hearings to get
a more accurate fix on just what has occurred in the agency. '38 A court might
require an agency to use a highly specific scientific methodology-Edley
instances the Ames test for bacterial mutagenicity.39 And a court might rest
its judgment of how far an agency could go in policymaking on its assessment
of whether, and to what extent, the incumbent president had secured a mandate
for change in his election campaign--work more for soothsayers than for
judges.
34. P. 213.
35. See R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPiRE 229, 238-40, 254-58 (1986).
36. 304 U.S. 1 (1938).
37. Pp. 54, 237.
38. Pp. 225-26.
39. P. 231; see also p. 262.
40. Pp. 60, 203-04. Edley also argues for judicial monitoring of participation in "bargaining" over
agency decisions. Pp. 197-99. But any monitoring of this process, beyond insisting that agencies conduct
any regulatory negotiation through meetings noticed in the Federal Register, see Harter, Negotiating
Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO. LU. 1, 79-82 (1982), would seem to entangle the courts to an
extraordinary degree in the details of a rule's evolution.
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Apart from specifics, we can draw inferences from the methodology.
Judicial review's source of legitimacy is to be its contribution to sound gover-
nance, its role to serve as "an alternative forum for decision making."4 1 And
the omissions are also telling. Because a relatively early discussion seemed to
me quite incomplete without a reference to the scarcity of agency resources,42
I tried to keep an eye out for allusions to that problem, or to the scarcity of
court or party resources, or to the time costs of the kind of review Edley
appears to favor, I found none. Life is short-too short for everyone to do
everything perfectly. No word alludes to the possibility that many disappoint-
ments with agency performance--especially ones involving delay or inac-
tion-may stem from the agency's choices about the allocation of its intellectu-
al and other resources. Nor is there a hint at any of the special problems of
judicial intervention on these subjects.
The book as a whole exudes an enormous enthusiasm for judicial interfer-
ence with agencies. As Edley was issues director for the Dukakis campaign for
two years,43 one supposes him a good liberal. Yet the judges that he urges on
to new heights of activism are now more likely than not to be appointees of
Presidents Reagan or Bush. What gives?
Edley briefly addresses the point: "What about the conservative judge
reviewing a liberal agency's action he or she considers wrong-headed? Does
sound governance review invite wholesale nullification of executive actions
with which willful judges disagree?"' He suggests three answers. Judges are
(sometimes) willful under the current dispensation, their willfulness only
masked to a degree by manipulation of the trichotomy. In addition, sound
governance review would bring the willfulness out into the open, with emphasis
on "the personal virtue of self-revelation." 45 Finally, he expresses the belief
that "the diversity and the independence provided by life tenure and tradition
make it likely that the pluralism of political and social life generally will be
reflected in the wills of judges." ' Especially so, he suggests, if the Senate
takes a very active view of its "advise and consent" role.47
The last item, of course, is a very practical one; if the Senate can keep
conservatives off the bench, then the risks are low. But I think more must be
at work. Two possibilities occur to me. One is a supposition that conservatives
will rigorously adhere to precedent, liberals not. Thus ground "gained" in any
era of liberal dominance will not be at risk, while liberals can use their eras
of dominance to correct any conservative activism. But while respect for
precedent may be greater among conservatives than among liberals, it is hard
41. P. 235.
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to imagine conservatives long feeling respect for so unprincipled a principle
as one-way stare decisis.48
Another possibility is that Edley (and other liberal advocates of activism)
cannot imagine any intelligent person finding conservative activism intellec-
tually respectable. If so, and if appointment to the federal bench will typically
require a modicum of intellect, it follows that most conservative judges will
not find doctrines that meet their own sense of intellectual respectability and
yet enable them to implement a conservative agenda. Thus conservative ap-
pointments, even if they may not much advance an agenda of liberal activism,
at least will not substitute a conservative variant; even without a manipulative
concept of stare decisis, judicial activism will remain a one-way ratchet. Of
course the deprecation of intellectually valid conservative activism implies a
finding that, for example, the intellectual quality of a Laurence Tribe is mani-
festly superior to that of a Richard Epstein. This is surely a quicksand.
We all want "sound governance." To this end we may vote, speak out, or
get into politics directly. The desire for sound governance may also play a role
in the readiness of some to become Article m judges. Courts have a duty in
appropriate cases to curb agency lawlessness, and carrying out that duty
contributes to sound governance. But just as masons building a cathedral should
not supplant the architect, even though both are creating a work of art, a judge
should not supplant the politician or administrator though all are seeking sound
governance. "They also serve who only stand and wait,"4 9 and so too those
who only construe the law.
48. See R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS 217 (1985).
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